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NEGLIGENCE-ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCEAnoLITION OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK AS A DEFENSE SEPARATE FROM CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IN AUTOMOBILE GUEST-HOST SITUATIONs--Plaintiff, a
guest in an automobile driven by defendant, was injured when defendant's
vehicle collided with another car. In plaintiff's suit against defendant and
her insurer the jury found that defendant was causally negligent as to
management and control and position on the highway, and that plaintiff
was causally negligent as to lookout. After apportioning 85 percent of
the negligence to defendant and 15 percent to plaintiff, the jury found
that plaintiff had assumed the risk with respect to defendant's management
and control and position on the highway, and the trial court therefore
entered judgment dismissing the complaint. On appeal, held, reversed. In
Wisconsin, hereafter, an automobile driver owes to his guest the same
duty of ordinary care that he owes to others; a guest's assumption of risk,
previously implied from his willingness to proceed in the face of a known
hazard, is no longer a defense apart from contributory negligence; and if
a guest's exposure of himself to a particular hazard is unreasonable and a
failure to exercise ordinary care for his own safety, such conduct constitutes
negligence, and is subject to the provisions of the state's comparative negligence statute. McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 113 N.W.2d
14 (Wis. I 962) .
Although assumption of risk and contributory negligence are entirely
separate legal doctrines, they sometimes become difficult to distinguish
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when applied to the conduct of an automobile guest. The distinction is
not particularly important in a jurisdiction recognizing both doctrines as
complete defenses in an action by the guest against the host, since a court's
mistake in characterizing the facts is harmless error as long as either of
~he two doctr,ines is applicable. But in a jurisdiction where contributory
negligence has been modified to a partial defense under a comparative
negligence statute, a practicable distinction is essential in determining the
respective rights of the host and guest.
Until 1931 Wisconsin courts employed the common-law rule totally
barring plaintiff's recovery for injuries resulting from defendant's negligence where plaintiff was contributorily negligent. At that time Wisconsin
adopted a comparative negligence statute1 enabling a negligent plaintiff
to recover that portion of his damages attributable to defendant's negligence. Plaintiff was completely barred only if the quantum of his negligence exceeded that of the defendant's. Nevertheless, Wisconsin courts
continued to recognize the defense of assumption of risk as a complete
bar to plaintiff's recovery.2
In Wisconsin the term "assumption of risk" was used to describe two
somewhat separate concepts. One of these ideas limited the host's duty
to his guest to that of a licensor to a licensee.3 The guest accepted as a
matter of law the condition of the automobile as he found it, subject only
to the limitation that the host could not set a trap or be guilty of active
negligence contributing to the injury of the guest.4 The guest also accepted -the driver with such skill and experience as he possessed. 5 Thus,
the duty of the host was limited to the exeroise of reasonable care to avoid
increasing the danger to the guest or creating a new danger. 6 This idea
was based neither on fault nor consent, but rather on the proposition that
the guest had no right to security greater than that enjoyed by his host. 7
Another concept, also labeled "assumption of risk," operated to avert
any legal liability on the part of the host where the guest was deemed
1 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 331.045 (1958). "Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery
in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence
resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as
great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages
allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable
to the person recovering."
2 For an extensive analysis of the assumption of risk doctrine in 'Wisconsin, see
Campbell, Host-Guest Rules in Wisconsin, 1943 Wis. L. REv. 180.
a O'Shea v. Lavoy, 175 Wis. 456, 462, 185 N.W. 525, 528 (1921).
4 Id. at 462-63, 185 N.W. at 528.
5 Cleary v. Eck.art, 191 Wis. 114, 120, 210 N.W. 267, 269 (1926). But as a practical
matter this limited duty theory was available to the host only when he could present
affirmative evidence that he was a bad driver. Campbell, Wisconsin's Law Governing
Automobile Accidents, 1962 WIS. L. REv. 240, 246.
O Cleary v. Eck.art, supra note 5, at 117-18, 210 N.W. at 268.
7 O'Shea v. Lavoy, 175 Wis. 456, 463, 185 N.W. 525, 528 (1921).
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to have consented to the risk resulting in his injury. Consent was implied
from the existence of a hazard or danger inconsistent with the safety of
the guest, knowledge and appreciation of the hazard by the guest, and acquiescence or willingness to proceed in the face of that hazard. 8 The
element of fault was irrelevant, and the guest was barred from recovery
against his host even where the assumption of risk could be characterized,
under the circumstances, as being reasonable.
Since the defense of assumption of risk was available in Wisconsin
only when plaintiff and defendant stood in a consensual relationship to
each other,9 its applicability was limited almost entirely to actions by the
guest against his host. 10 Since the guest had no relationship wit:h the
driver of another automobile on which to base any finding of consent,
the doctrine of assumption of risk did not operate to bar the guest's recovery against a negligent third party. 11 Even if the guest's assumption of risk
was unreasonable and therefore constituted a failure to exercise reasonable
care for his own safety, 12 such acquiescence in the negligence of his host
was simply contributory negligence with respect to the negligent third
party. Therefore the guest still had a chance to recover part of his
damages against the third party under the comparative negligence statute.
In the principal case the court based its objections to the assumption
of risk doctrine on the arguments that (1) a guest is entitled to more
protection than that received by a licensee, 13 (2) the social value in protecting drivers who have extended their hospitality to guests no longer
outweighs the consequences of implying consent by the guest to the serious
injuries commonly arising out of today's automobile accidents,14 and (3)
a literal application of the doctrine in cases where the guest, as a practical
matter, has little choice but to consent, works a harsh result. 15 The doc8 Scory v. LaFave, 215 Wis. 21, 26, 254 N.W. 643, 645 (1934); Knipfer v. Shaw, 210
Wis. 617, 621, 246 N.W. 328, 330 (1933).
1l Schiro v. Oriental Realty Co., 272 Wis. 537, 548, 76 N.W.2d 355, 360 (1956). See
Comment, 1960 WIS. L. REV. 460, 468-73.
10 Although master and servant stand in a consensual relationship to each other,
the Wisconsin legislature has abolished assumption of risk as a defense in an action
by an employee against an employer of four or more. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 331.37 (1958).
Although the statute expressly excludes farm labor from its coverage, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has decided "that any conduct of a farm laborer, which evinces want
of ordinary care for his own safety, constitutes contributory negligence and is subject
to comparison under [the comparative negligence statute]. This will have the effect
of largely, if not entirely, abrogating in farm labor cases the defense of assumption of
risk as an absolute bar to recovery where the conduct alleged falls short of express
consent." Colson v. Rule, 113 N.W.2d 21, 25 (Wis. 1962).
11 See Walker v. Kroger Grocery and Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 532, 252 N.W. 721,
726 (1934); 1961 Wis. L. REv. 677, 678.
12 Howe v. Corey, 172 Wis. 537, 540, 179 N.W. 791, 792 (1920).
13 Principal case at 19.
14 Ibid.
Hi Baird v. Cornelius, 12 Wis. 2d 284, 299-300, 107 N.W .2d 278, 286 (1961) (concurring
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trine also prejudiced the position of a negligent third-party driver16 where
the host was also negligent and the guest was held to have assumed the
risk. Since the absence of any common liability between the host and
the third party barred the latter from any right of contribution against
the host, the third party alone was liable for any amount recoverable by
the guest17 even though most of the negligence which caused the accident
might actually have been attributable to the host. With assumption of risk
abolished as a defense separate from contributory negligence, contribution
should now be more readily available to the negligent third party whenever the negligence of the host has contributed to the guest's injuries.
Under facts where the assumption of risk formerly operated as an
affirmative defense based on consent, the host may now invoke the comparative negligence statute whenever the guest's consent to his negligence
is unreasonable. On .the other hand, if the guest's consent is reasonable,
the guest will be allowed full recovery. Under facts where the assumption
of risk formerly operated as a limitation on the duty of the host, and the
question of negligence and contributory negligence was .therefore never
reached, the host may now be held liable for injuries caused by his own
disabilities or by mechanical defects of which he was aware or should
have been aware. And if such is the case, the jury may also have to
decide at what point such disability or mechanical defect, of which the
guest was aware or should have been aware, becomes so serious that the
guest's decision to ride with the host constitutes a lack of reasonable
care for his own safety.
Some of the other possible effects of this decision on the determination of liability in future cases are difficult to predict. From the abolition
of assumption of risk, it does not necessarily follow that all conduct previously treated as involving an assumption of risk rather than contributory
negligence will now be ignored. Since the jury will be given contributory
negligence instructions in cases where such instructions were previously
refused, it is conceivable that the assumption of risk previously considered reasonable will in some cases be now considered unreasonable conduct.
And in cases where assumption of risk limited the duty of the host and
therefore eliminated the necessity of examining the reasonableness of the
guest's conduct, the application of the doctrine of contributory negligence
will involve the use of objective standards of reasonableness yet to be formulated. While .this decision obviously effectively expands the scope of
contributory negligence in Wisconsin jurisprudence, the exact line between
opinion). As early as 1934 it was suggested that the assumption of risk doctrine was
unnecessary in Wisconsin automobile host-guest cases. Scory v. LaFave, 215 Wis. 21, 35,
38, 254 N.W. 643, 649, 650 (1934).
16
17

See Campbell, Host-Guest Rules in Wisconsin, 1943 Wis. L. REv. 180, 203-04.
Shrofe v. Rural Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 258 Wis. 128, 132, 45 N.W.2d 76, 78 (1950).
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negligent and non-negligent conduct in areas formerly covered by the
assumption of risk doctrine remains to be determined in later decisions.

S. Anthony Benton

